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Secretary of Defense was focused on
building up Army and Air Force strength
in Western Europe, while naval forces
languished because they were seen as of
lesser utility. Hayward set out to chal-
lenge this strategic vision by commis-
sioning and then championing a naval
force-planning study called “Sea Plan
2000.” The essence of this plan was the
assertion that any assault across the
inner-German border would result in a
global war. Naval forces provided strike
capabilities that could be marshaled
anywhere, while protecting the sea-
lanes. The redoubtable head of the Soviet
navy, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, had
enunciated a strategy of protecting his
ballistic missile submarines in their
northern bastions. Sea Plan 2000 advo-
cated naval-based offensive strikes
against the Kola Peninsula and against
Soviet attack and missile submarines
worldwide.
When President Ronald Reagan took
office in 1981, John Lehman became
secretary of the Navy and aggressively
supported such an offensive maritime
strategy. The U.S. Navy budget in-
creased, and the Soviets worried. Their
self-confidence was dented, as they later
freely admitted. No one could predict
what would occur in an actual war, but
according to Kagan, “Hayward’s real-
ization that the Navy’s greatest weak-
ness was its strategic thinking made
possible a transformation of the Navy’s
capabilities with few new technologies.
As a result, the Navy regained a consid-
erable degree of balance against a wan-
ing Soviet threat.”
Conversely, Kagan cites the efforts of
former secretary of defense Donald
Rumsfeld to “transform” the services as
flawed in both concept and process. He
criticizes the recent focus on information
technologies, with the attendant as-
sumption that fewer forces will be
needed as a consequence. Further, he
questions whether the process of trans-
formation is really advanced by grafting
an “Office of Force Transformation”
(since abolished) onto the Department
of Defense, arguing that the services
were in fact taking full advantage of in-
formation technologies for a decade be-
fore a “revolution in military affairs”
was decreed.
On balance, Kagan gives the services
good marks for their stewardship over
the past twenty-five years as the na-
tion’s guardians. The current war in
Iraq, however, worries him, because the
military did not adapt swiftly enough.
He is too good a scholar to make
sweeping assertions about American
martial superiority. Instead, he argues
that the process of adapting in order to
win is the nation’s greatest strength.
Finding the Target will make an excel-
lent textbook for those whose opera-
tional jobs have not left sufficient time
to keep abreast of the changing strategic
perspective in the services.
F. J. “BING” WEST
Newport, Rhode Island
Goldstein, Lyle J. Preventive Attack and Weapons
of Mass Destruction: A Comparative Analysis.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2006.
268pp. $50
Do nuclear weapons represent a source
of stability in world politics, or does the
acquisition of these weapons create in-
centives for established nuclear states or
longtime rivals to destroy nascent nu-
clear weapons programs before they ac-
tually coalesce into significant strategic
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forces? The answer to both key ques-
tions, according to Lyle Goldstein, is
yes. The acquisition of nuclear weapons
creates the incentive to prevent war, ex-
acerbate existing rivalries, and produce
crises, but over time even asymmetric
nuclear balances tend to moderate en-
during rivalries and calm more acute
conflicts.
Goldstein’s primary purpose is to ad-
dress the contemporary debate between
“proliferation optimists” and “prolifer-
ation pessimists.” Proliferation opti-
mists suggest that nuclear weapons will
have a moderating effect on interna-
tional relations. Because nuclear arse-
nals provide mechanisms for states to
protect their fundamental security con-
cerns while increasing the potential
costs of war, leaders tend to be moder-
ate when dealing with not only their
own nuclear weapons but their oppo-
nents’ arsenals as well. Optimists also
believe that governments everywhere
tend to be good stewards of their nu-
clear capabilities, generally treating
them as political instruments, not as an
enhancement to their war-fighting ca-
pabilities. Proliferation pessimists,
however, argue that a situation of mu-
tual assured destruction (MAD), not
nuclear weapons per se, is what induced
caution between competing capitals
during the Cold War. In the absence of
MAD, they believe, states face mount-
ing pressure to launch preventive war
to destroy nascent nuclear weapons
programs. New nuclear states, accord-
ing to the pessimists, lack the resources,
technical expertise, and stable govern-
ments that are needed to construct sur-
vivable nuclear arsenals, especially
those that remain under negative con-
trol and in times of extreme stress.
Goldstein addresses this debate with a
survey of the most significant interna-
tional confrontations involving nuclear
and nonnuclear states, exploring the
incentives, perceptions, and judgments
of nuclear-armed leaders as they con-
template the prospects and pitfalls of
launching preventive war to disarm
emerging nuclear powers. His compara-
tive case studies span the entire nuclear
age: from the U.S. reaction to the emer-
gence of a Soviet nuclear weapons pro-
gram, American and Soviet responses to
the Chinese nuclear program, and the
Israeli strike against Iraq’s Osiraq reac-
tor, to both U.S. counterproliferation
wars against Iraq. His case studies reveal
that although the leaders in dominant
states often contemplate preventive war,
a host of issues conspires to prevent them
from launching strikes to destroy emerg-
ing nuclear forces and infrastructures.
Goldstein’s finding that preventive
counterproliferation strikes are rare is
offset by several observations that are
not at all reassuring. Counterprolifer-
ation attacks have been contemplated
from the start of the nuclear age, but
actual attacks are a relatively recent
phenomenon. Goldstein’s analysis sug-
gests that the revolutions in conven-
tional precision guidance and global
reconnaissance capabilities have tipped
the balance in favor of preventive war,
although risks still remain. U.S. officers
and officials, for instance, were deeply
concerned about the prospect that
Saddam Hussein might retaliate with
chemical or biological weapons when it
became clear that the regime in Bagh-
dad itself was the target of coalition op-
erations in 2003; nevertheless, members
of the administration were ultimately
undeterred by what they considered to
be a credible threat. Goldstein concludes
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with an even more disturbing observa-
tion: that world politics might be
entering a period of pronounced insta-
bility as the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and associated delivery sys-
tems accelerates. More opportunities
will soon present themselves to stop am-
bitious nascent nuclear states in their
tracks.
Goldstein’s narrative is compelling, the-
oretically informed, well written, and well
organized. His comparative study sheds
light on the proliferation optimism/
pessimism debate, even though his con-
clusions are unlikely to satisfy either
camp. Skeptics might point out that his
case studies are a bit cursory and lack
documentary evidence drawn from the
various capitals in question. To its
credit, however, Goldstein’s work is rel-
atively comprehensive and provides a
global perspective on how preventive
war dynamics play out among Western
and non-Western antagonists. It also
provides a chronological perspective on
how the phenomenon of preventive war
might, in fact, be changing. His work
thus constitutes a significant and en-
during contribution to the literature on




Kennedy, Paul. The Parliament of Man: The Past,
Present, and Future of the United Nations. New
York: Random House, 2006. 384pp. $26.95
An institution as central to the contem-
porary world’s political and geostrategic
landscape as the United Nations is con-
stantly in need of thoughtful, scholarly
attention. Paul Kennedy delivers just
this with The Parliament of Man. Ken-
nedy, the author of The Rise and Fall of
the Great Powers and Grand Strategies in
War and Peace, approves of the idea of
the UN but is not blind to its failings.
He believes that “since this is the only
world organization that we possess, we
need to make it work in the best way
possible, in order to help humankind
navigate our present turbulent cen-
tury.” Consequently, while the book is
mostly historical, a consistent tone of
apology runs along with the narrative.
It is a story, Kennedy writes, of “evolu-
tion, metamorphosis, and experiment,
of failure and success,” but a story that
is ultimately justified.
A solid introductory chapter traces the
deepest roots of the UN back to post–
Napoleonic Europe, but Kennedy very
naturally spends most of his time exam-
ining events in the wake of World War
I. Here Kennedy rehearses the prehis-
tory of the UN from the advent of its
predecessor, the League of Nations,
through that organization’s failures and
the consequent outbreak of World War
II. While this chapter contains little in
the way of new information or startling
revelations, it is well written, succinct,
and peppered with insights.
What follows are several thematic chap-
ters on such topics as the working of
the Security Council, the execution of
peacekeeping missions, the idea of hu-
man rights, UN economic policies, and
so on. Here one comes to appreciate the
true breadth of the United Nations.
Kennedy’s examination of the Security
Council is especially timely, given the
growing pressures for its expansion and
restructuring. Kennedy’s account of the
UN’s track record in peacekeeping op-
erations (arguably its highest-profile
role in much of the world) is prefaced
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